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THE CIVIL WAR IN CHAD
on
For a brief moment this summer, world attention was focused on Chad. The country, which gained independence from France
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Why, then, all the attention? More specifically, why was the Reagan administration so concerned? The June-August fighting
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Chief among these "outside agitators" are Libya historically and the United States currently. Despite the absence of a discernable
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itself is not important to them; the "real problem" is Libya, which is involved in Chad at the behest of the Soviet Union.
Since 1979, the Organization of African Unity (OA U) has been actively involved in finding a solution to this seemingly unsolvable
background
conflict. This ISSUE BRIEF presents the views of Oumarou Youssoufou, OA U Ambassador to the United Nations, describes the
and causes of the conflict, and examines the Reagan administration's policy toward Chad. □

How would you characterize the situation in Chad? What
are the principal factors that led to the current outbreak of
fighting?
YOUSSOUFOU: The situation in Chad today is basically
the same as it has been for the past twenty years with very
little variation. Since its independence in 1960, Chad has
had only about three or four years of peace. It has gone
from crisis to crisis and from war to war. One fundamental
problem is that the country, which has a great deal of potential, has not been able to attract foreign investment or to
bring about economic development.
The situation in Chad is clearly a civil war-with foreign
involvement. Officially, eleven different factions or political
entities are struggling for some sort of control of different
parts of the country. No faction in the Chad conflict has
ever claimed any foreign ideology as the raison d'etre of its
struggle. Most of the divisions are from the northern part
of Chad. Most of them are of the Moslem religion, and they
are from the same areas. Therefore, neither religion nor
ethnicity is a problem in Chad.
What role has Libya played in this conflict? What are the
causes of Libyan intervention?
YOUSSOUFO U: That question should not be directed to
me; it should be directed to the Libyan diplomatic delegation . Libya is a neighbor of Chad; and like all of Chad's
neighbors, it has some interest in the current situation and
in the OAU attempts to find a peaceful solution. Indeed,
all of the neighboring countries are involved in finding some
kind of solution to the conflict.

NONE OF THE
PARTIES IN THE
CONFLICT HAS
THE CAPACITY
TO CONTINUE A
SUSTAINED WAR.
... WE FEEL
THAT FOREIGN
WITHDRAW AL
WOULD FORCE
THE CHADIAN
POLITICAL FACTIONS TO ACCEPT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO
THIS PROBLEM.
His Excellency Oumarou Youssoufou

As to the particular position or the involvement of Libya,
I cannot comment. I would have been in a better position
to comment if the OAU had been able to send a fact-finding
mission. We were supposed to send a mission to Libya; but
for all kinds of reasons, the mission could not go into the
area. Consequently, the OAU has had to depend only on
what we have read in the press . If the OAU had been able
to send a delegation or a fact-finding mission in the field,
then we would have been able to assess the situation. All
we know now is that Libya is one of the parties involved
in finding some kind of peaceful solution to the Chad
conflict.

Is there any validity to the Reagan administration's conceptualization of the conflict in East-West terms?
YOUSSOUFOU: Clearly, African national and regional
problems cannot be understood in the context of the EastWest conflict. Africa's problems have nothing to do with
ideology. The issue for our continent is neither capitalism
nor communism or socialism. Africa's problem today is economic development, and that is our major concern. Some
of us attempt to achieve this goal through a socialist system,
others through the free economic system.
There is a conflict in Chad. The OAU is involved in finding a solution to that problem; but we do not look at the
situation in Chad in terms of left or right, radical or
moderate, nor East or West.
In 1979 the OAU met to seek a resolution to the conflict
in Chad. What conditions did the OAU set and how were
these conditions observed hy the parties to the dispute? How
has the OAU position changed over time?
YOUSSOUFOU: At the OAU conference in Lagos, Nigeria,
the eleven Chadian factions met with the participation of
neighboring countries. After about ten days of very difficult
and tedious negotiations, we were able to create the transition government of national unity, which had as its President
Goukouni Woddeye. Part of the cabinet also was formed:
the Foreign Ministry was given to Acy! Ahmat , who died
in an airplane accident a few months ago, and the Ministry
of Defense was given to Hissene Habre, who is one of the
leaders of that country today.
Once that transitional government went back to
Ndjamena, other problems evolved. Eventually, the OAU
sent a peacekeeping force to Chad. They encountered the
same problems that peacekeeping forces in the Middle East
now are facing . That is, what do you do? What is your role?
Do you fight or do you just separate the factions? In spite
of the presence of this OAU peacekeeping force, which was
not to be involved in any war in Chad, there was a conflict
within the government. The government broke up, and the
Minister of Defense was able to organize his own army and
to assume power through a coup.
The OAU, as an organization, has faced coups in many
countries throughout the Continent during the last twentythree years. Therefore, we have a consistent policy: we do
not interfere in the internal affairs of any nation in Africa.
When there is a coup, if the country's people are against
the government, they will oppose it. It is not up to the OAU
to accept or reject; we remain neutral. As a result, there has
been no real change in the OAU position with respect to
Chad. Whoever is in control of the government is considered
the head of state of that country. This is the case in Chad.
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The OAU has sent a delegation-headed by the current
Chairman, the President of Ethiopia-to France, Libya, and
other neighboring countries to find a way in which we can
get the warring parties to sit around a table and negotiate.
This is the only way out. Sending more arms, more guns,
and more destructive materiel will not solve the problem.
Are you hopeful in the short-term?
YOUSSOUFOU: Yes, we are hopeful in the short-term
because we feel that if those countries, either African or nonAfrican, that are involved in the Chadian situation were to
withdraw or at least stop any active support, then that would
force the Chadians to negotiate. None of the parties in the
conflict has the capacity to continue a sustained war. Therefore, we feel that foreign withdrawal would force the Chadian political factions to accept a peaceful settlement to the
conflict.
But the Western powers are not going to disengage until
Libya disengages. Is there to be a simultaneous reduction
in force?
YOUSSOUFOU: I cannot answer that question in any intelligible way because the process of negotiations is going
on right now between different parties in Chad, but I am
hopeful that a solution can be found. I do not believe that
SENDING MORE ARMS, MORE GUNS, AND MORE
DESTRUCTIVE MATERIEL WILL NOT SOLVE THE
PROBLEM [IN CHAD].

any of the foreign countries involved in Chad wants to continue that war indefinitely. The stakes are such that no country that is involved today wants to stay in Chad over the
long-run. All of thei:n would like to find some sort of a
solution.
But what kind of a solution would be necessary? Would
that solution be acceptable to the Chadian people or would
it only be acceptable to those foreign countries that are involved in the Chad conflict? That to me is the issue.
Right now we are at an impasse. We have more or less
a de facto ceasefire situation which I hope will eventually
result in a declared ceasefire and then in negotiations.
Would partitioning the country be a viable solution? Would
an OAU peacekeeping force be either feasible or desirable
at some point?
YOUSSOUFOU: We, as a continent, do not believe in the
partition of Chad or any other country. We have to be consistent with our past decisions and resolutions. In 1964 at
the first OAU Summit in Cairo, Egypt, we agreed that the
borders which were created by the colonial governments
would be accepted and respected. We do not like them. They
do not take into account our realities, our culture, or our
well-being, but we have no choice but to keep them. We
would be opening a Pandora's box if we started changing
the borders. In the spirit of that resolution, we cannot support the partition of Chad. Some other solution must be
found through negotiations among the differing parties.
Eventually, we might have to send another OAU peacekeeping force to Chad, but we have not reached that point
yet in the negotiations. Other African countries are very
concerned about Chad and will do anything they can to
help even if it means sending in another peacekeeping
force. □

HISTORICAL PROFILE OF THE I CHADIAN CIVIL WAR

The policies of French colonial administration are among
the more significant causes of today's civil war in Chad .
Over and above the inherently detrimental nature of all colonial administrations, French policies during the sixty years
of formal rule over Chad contributed heavily towards the
current problems. Arguably, the most damaging of French
colonial transgressions in Chad was the widespread denial
of education, political, and economic roles to large segments
of the population. Prior to the 1940s, the ethnic majoritythe Sara in the South-was the most vocal victim of this
policy. However, the most disinherited segment of Chad 's
population had been those who inhabited the northern twothirds of the country. Indeed, the French referred to the
southern third as "le Tchad utile" (useful Chad), implying
that the northern sector was useless. Thus , northern resentment of French exclusion forms a potent cause of today's
strife. The policies of the post-independence government
proved to be the last straw.
The regime of Chad's first President, Ngartha Tombalbaye, lasted fifteen years from independence in 1960 to
the April 13, 1975 coup in which he was killed. Tombalbaye,
a member of the Sara ethnic group, continued to suppress
and exclude the Muslim north. The north 's negative reaction to Tombalbaye's rule took many forms , leading
ultimately to the formation of FROLINAT, a national
liberation movement, and to the start of the armed struggle
against the government and its French allies.
Following Tombalbaye's death, leadership of the Ndjamena government was assumed by General Felix Malloum,
another southerner, who was encouraged by France to embark on a policy of reconciliation. Malloum's reconciliation
effort was largely unsuccessful; and FROLINAT won important battles. Malloum attempted to negotiate a ceasefire,
but FROLINAT hardened its position and demanded stiff
concessions.
In an attempt to weaken FRO LINA T, Malloum made
overtures to Hissene Habre, who recently had been expelled
as leader of the main FROLINAT army. In 1978 in the
Sudan, Malloum and Habre reached an agreement: Habre
joined the government and was made its Prime Minister.
Months later, the Malloum-Habre rapprochement fell apart
allegedly as a result of Habre's power grab. Fighting ensued
between Habre's northern troops and the largely southern
government troops.
Meanwhile, Goukouni Woddeye was enjoying considerable success leading FROLINAT armies against French
troops in northern Chad. Consequently, he was in control
of large portions of the country. The French, under political
pressure at home, scaled down their military objectives in
Chad, refused to intervene in the Malloum-Habre fighting,
and looked for a way to withdraw.
Alarmed by the spreading fighting, Nigeria mounted a
diplomatic offensive in 1979 that has affected profoundly
the controlling power in Ndjamena ever since. The Nigerians
organized four meetings involving the armed factions and
neighboring countries. The first meeting was attended by
the leaders of the major armed factions-Malloum, Habre,
and Woddeye, among others-and resulted in a ceasefire,
the resignation of both Malloum and Habre, and the introduction of a Nigerian peacekeeping force.
A second conference was scheduled to determine the composition of a transitional national government after the
resignation of Malloum and Habre. When the conference

reached no agreement, it ended in disarray. Habre and Woddeye accused neighboring countries (primarily Nigeria) of
heavy-handed manipulation aimed at installing a pliant, puppet government in Ndjamena.
The major Chadian leaders decided to go their own way
in filling the Ndjamena power vacuum . The provisional
council, headed by Woddeye, was dissolved; and a provisional government, headed by Mahamat Shawa, was
formed. Habre became Defense Minister and Woddeye
became Interior Minister. Col. Kamougue, who was in
Ndjamena during the formation of the government, left for
the south ostensibly to quell secessionist threats . Once he
got there, however, he assumed leadership of the secessionist
faction and denounced the Shawa government.
The Shawa government received a very hostile reaction
from Chad's neighbors, especially Libya and Nigeria.
Comparing it to the Muzorewa regime in Rhodesia, they
threatened to withdraw their support from any further
reconciliation effort. Nigeria cut off oil supplies to Chad,
and Libya backed Ahmat Acyl's attempt to take over large
portions of the north and financed and armed Kamougue' s
secessionist movement.
At the 1979 OAU summit, Nigeria and Libya vehemently opposed the seating of the Chad delegation, which was
consequently barred from participating. The Shawa government originally tried fighting back. It battled the Libyasupported armies in the north with considerable success .
Eventually, however, the Shawa government gave in and
attended a second Lagos conference along with representatives of eleven Chadian factions and neighboring countries . It agreed on an elaborate set of conditions, including:
a ceasefire, demilitarization of Ndjamena, a peacekeeping
force drawn from countries not sharing a border with Chad,
withdrawal of French troops, disbandment of factional armies, formation of a new national armed force, formation
of a government of national unity with Woddeye as President, and elections within eighteen months.
Upon return to Chad, the factions formed the Government of National Unity (GUNT). Key cabinet positions included: Woddeye, President; Kamougue , Vice-President;
Habre, Defense Minister; and Ahmat Acy!, Foreign
Minister.

HISTORICAL PROFILE (Continued)

In early 1980, fighting erupted between Habre's troops
and those of the other factions in the GUNT government.
Habre retreated to central and eastern Chad where he won
several battles against the GUNT forces. The cabinet dismissed Habre as Defense Minister, charged that he was receiving aid from Sudan and Egypt, and threatened to seek
Libyan help. Throughout the year, Habre's forces won important battles and continued to press towards Ndjamena.
The GUNT government, on the other hand, got embroiled
in disagreements and proved ineffective. Finally, Woddeye
called in the Libyans . In December 1980 the Libyans
defeated Habre's forces and strengthened the authority of
the GUNT government. Habre sought refuge across the
border in Sudan; and except for a few minor skirmishes,
the Libyans had effective military control of the country.
But the presence of Libyan troops elicited sharp protests
from the West and from conservative African regimes . Other
African countries and the GUNT pointed out that Chad was
exercising a sovereign right. They ignored warnings that the
intervention constituted the first step in the building of a
Libyan empire through armed conquest and subversion.
However, when Libya and Chad announced a merger in
January 1981, the warnings became more ominous. The antiQaddafy forces stepped up their campaign to get rid of
Libyan trooops in Chad. Libya declared that the troops
would leave when asked to do so by the legitimate government. The Woddeye government, on the other hand, said
it would retain the troops so long as Habre's insurgency remained a threat. In response, the U.S. and France prodded
the OAU and Chad and promised support for the OAU
peacekeeping force and for Chad should the Libyans leave.
In November Woddeye gave in to the pressure and asked
the Libyan troops to leave. Warning that the Habre insurgency would rear up again, Libya pulled out its entire
force in a matter of days. The OAU dispatched a 3,500-man
peacekeeping force drawn from Zaire, Nigeria, and Senegal.
The Habre forces moved in from Sudan and gained control
over large sections of eastern and northern Chad . Woddeye
charged that the Habre forces were being armed by Egypt
and Sudan and threatened to seek external help. In February
the OAU invited Woddeye to a Nairobi meeting of its ad
hoc committee on Chad to discuss maintenance of the
peacekeeping force. Faced with Habre's strength and the
lack of funding for the peacekeeping force, the committee
members decided to cut their losses. They asked Woddeye
to call a ceasefire within weeks, negotiate with Habre, and
hold elections. Woddeye, insisting that the OAU force
should fight the insurgency as the Libyans had, branded the
OAU decision a betrayal and left the meeting. In Chad the
peacekeeping force refused to fight Habre, who subsequently
defeated the GUNT forces in several battles and captured
Ndjamena in June 1982. The government broke into its factions and headed south. Woddeye vowed" ... to march on
Ndjamena ... " and sought asylum in Algeria.
Habre established a provisional government and sought
negotiations with other factions. He succeeded in winning
over a section of the Kamougue forces who had split over
the question of joining the Habre government. Kamougue
himself eventually joined Woddeye as did the forces originally headed by the GUNT Foreign Minister, the late Ahmat
Acy!. Woddeye has established his own provisional government as well as an "Army for National Liberation."
At the 1982 abortive OAU summit in Tripoli, Habre and

Woddeye both sent delegations. The Habre delegation was
seen as having more support, a situation that was confirmed
at the 1983 OAU summit in Addis Ababa. Woddeye has
since attempted to fulfill his threat ''. ._. to march on
Ndjamena ... " using strong Libyan backing. Pro-Habre
governments have charged that Woddeye's forces are largely, if not wholly, Libyan. However, in June both the UN
and the French Foreign Minister stated that no evidence of
regular Libyan troops has been found. The Woddeye forces
attacked from the north and by July controlled FayaLargeau and Abeche.
The 1983 fighting brought forth an enormous amount of
international outcry, largely led by the U.S., and generated
considerable overt support for Habre. This massive support
of Ndjamena has stopped the Woddeye forces (who are
receiving large quantities of Libyan arms) and resulted in
the current stalemate. Since late August, Chad has been
divided into two north and south sections, controlled by two
heavily-armed and hostile armies.
Although most Western observers have tended to see the
Chadian problem as resulting from"the unbridgeable
ethnic/ religious gap" between the Muslim north and the
non-Muslim south, ethnic diversity in and of itself is not
a sufficient cause for civil war in Chad or any other country. Chad, with at least 192 ethnic groups, is typical of other
African nations in being ethnically diverse. After all, Tanzania, ranked on the basis of ethnicity as the most
heterogeneous nation in the world, has not had a notable
civil disturbance in its sovereign history while the two
Koreas, ranked together as the most homogeneous, are today divided into two armed and hostile camps. In Chad,
however, ethnic diversity has provided a conducive climate
in which other causal factors have resulted in armed insurrection and civil war.
Personal animosity between Chad's leaders is accepted today as one of the major reasons why the conflict has not
been solved. As Rene LeMarchand has said, "personalities
are all important ... " in the Chadian civil war. Indeed,
some observers see this factor, especially between leaders
of the same northern origins, as having eclipsed, if only for
now, the north's resentment of southern domination of
political power. It is widely believed that animosity between
Habre and Kamougue and between Habre and Woddeye has
contributed significantly to the breakup of previous attempted solutions. Indeed, despite his acknowledged
strengths, Habre, reportedly, is seen by his colleagues and
observers as being a ruthlessly ambitious, intransigent leader
who has managed to make more important enemies than
all other Chadian leaders. Many observers, therefore, believe
that the animosity and distrust between Habre and Woddeye is likely to be one of the major obstacles to a new
reconciliation.
Finally, that external patrons have prolonged Chad's civil
war should be rather obvious. An underdeveloped country
that is one of the poorest in the world with no military production capacity is simply not capable of fighting a modern
civil war for eighteen years if outside sources had not been
pouring in arms, money, training, and troops. Until outside intervention of all kinds is stopped, a political solution
to Chad's seemingly endless civil war is not likely to be
found. □

REAGAN WATCH: FIGHTING THE COLD WAR IN CHAD
"We have to bear in mind that there is an ongoing hot war,
and the two contending parties fare] the government of Chad
and the government of Libya . . .. It is basically a LibyanChadian conflict."

Chester Crocker

Publicly, the Reagan administration asserts that its policy
toward Chad is to remain neutral in the civil war, express
no preference among the various factional leaders, and encourage work towards political reconciliation. It also opposes external involvement and aggression in Chad. The
State Department offers evidence in support of this statement: the U.S. provided $12 million to support the OAU's
peacekeeping force and $4 million in emergency (food)
assistance to the Chad government in 1982. The Department
justifies U.S. recognition of the Hissene Habre government
on the grounds that the Goukouni Woddeye government was
too weak and intransigent and that the overwhelming majority of OAU members also recognize Habre.
An examination of what evidence is available, however,
reveals that the policy that actually has been prosecutedcovertly and overtly-in Chad, may not be as fair-minded
or balanced as the public statements would imply.
Upon assumption of office and throughout 1981, the
Reagan administration expressed serious concern about the
"Libyan occupation of Chad" and called for Libyan
withdrawal. It assured both the OAU and Chad President
Woddeye that it would support the GUNT government and
contribute financially towards the upkeep of the OAU
peacekeeping force.
And yet during this same period, the administration
allegedly was engaged in activities at variance with its public
declarations . These activities amounted to one thing: strong
covert support of Habre. Egypt and Sudan, close allies of
the U.S. in the region, continued to provide Habre with
arms, sanctuary, and, it has been alleged, troops . Most
significantly, the CIA is said to have given Habre $10 million
around the time he met U.S. Ambassador-at-Large, General
Vernon Walters in Sudan.
After the Libyans withdrew in 1982, the U.S. provided
support for the OAU peacekeeping force: $12 million to provide airlift and non-lethal equipment-less than eight percent of what the OAU had estimated it needed.
As soon as Habre assumed power in June 1982, the U.S.
lost no time in recognizing him. As the State Department
says, "We enjoy cordial relations with the new Habre provisional government." Shortly thereafter, large amounts of
military and lesser amounts of economic aid were extended
to Chad.
Although the June-August 1983 fighting in Chad was
simply an attempt by Woddeye-with Libyan support-to
dislodge Habre, the Reagan administration sees the fighting
as an invasion of Chad by Libya on behalf of the Russians.
This view has facilitated providing Habre with strong
military and diplomatic support. First, Reagari sent two
AW ACS planes, a complement of fighter and reconnaissance escort planes, Redeye anti-aircraft missiles, and
a number of military personnel. American military presence
may have reached five hundred men. The President quickly
invoked the War Powers Act and informed Congress .

Next, the administration pressured certain of its allies and
friends to support Habre. With the President declaring that
Chad is within the French "sphere of influence," the administration persuaded France-after initial public
protestations-to send arms. By the end of August, France
had sent fighter planes, anti-tank helicopters, large amounts
of other equipment, and 2,000 troops, headed by a general,
to Chad. Also, two Francophone African presidents, Diouf
of Senegal and Mobutu of Zaire, visited Washington and
called for help for Habre. Days after leaving Washington,
Mobutu had dispatched planes and troops and had paid an
official visit to Chad-a move Reagan praised as
"courageous." Since August, the administration has provided an additional $25 million in arms directly to Chad.
By late September, according to the State Department, $13
million had been utilized.
U.S. critics of the Reagan administration's actions may
be grouped around three positions. One group regards Chad
as much too insignificant to warrant the attention and aid
it recently has received. The second group of critics argues
that the whole problem would have been quickly solved if
strong military action had been taken against the Libyans.
A final group thinks that the U.S. role should be much more
active involvement in finding a political settlement and that
the strong military support will only exacerbate the situation.
But Reagan's policy toward Chad emanates from two
ideological viewpoints : first, the conflict is a manifestation
of U.S .-Soviet, East-West rivalry and second, African nations fall within "spheres of influence" belonging to other
nations. Influential critics in both the U.S . and Africa
publicly object to both of these attitudes. They point out
that the absurdity of the "spheres" argument in particular:
if nations are entitled to such "spheres" thanks to their
economic and military strength, then why not Libya, which
is currently one of the richest and strongest African states?
That "spheres of influence" remains a de facto operating
principle in international relations cannot be denied,
however.
Reagan's policy appears to be suffused with an ulterior
motive: use Chad to "clip Qaddafy' s wings and bloody his
nose." Others argue that Reagan favors Habre because he
agreed to construction of U.S. bases in Chad. Another "real
aim," some suggest, is to protect Israel by preventing
Qaddafy from sending Chadian uranium to Pakistan for the
manufacture of an Islamic bomb.
But with the large quantities of arms that have been introduced into Chad lately, foreign governments, like the
U.S., merely have prolonged and exacerbated Chad's problems. The eighteen year old Chadian civil war has shown
that-with one exception-all the ingredients needed for an
unwinnable war have been present: a vast territory, impossible to control through armed might; ethnic and religious
diversity; extreme poverty; years of economic mismanagement; political repression and injustice; ambitious but weak
local leaders; and foreign patronage. What had prevented
the conflict from being even more destructive was the
absence of large quantities of modern weapons from the major powers. The 1983 fighting has enabled the U.S ., Libya,
France, and Zaire to provide that missing link. Ironically,
the immediate effect has been the current stalemate.
However , if advantage is not taken of this de facto ceasefire,
if a just political solution is not found, Chad is more than
likely to become Africa's Lebanon. D
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